As
is known to readers of this journal, Gregory Gronbacher and
Daniel Finn have engaged in an interesting dialogue about
economic personalism. It is not my intention to review here
all that they have written. My objective is to show that their
dialogue not only touches upon key aspects of the Christianity–classical
liberalism debate but also that it is fruitful in itself,
since it leads to a series of additional considerations that
enhance our understanding of economic personalism. These additional
considerations will not be concerned with the details and
divergences in Gronbacher's and Finn's respective positions.
Instead, I will attempt to make clear the "horizons of
understanding" that informs their writing. In doing so,
it will be possible, using Gadamer's terminology, to establish
a fusion of horizons.
WHAT
IS FINN'S CONCERN?
Why
does Finn respond as he does? From where is he coming in his
response to Gronbacher? Gronbacher has evidently done something
quite simple. He asked for a dialogue between Christian personalism
and the three schools of free-market economics. So, what is
the problem? What could be objectionable in such a proposal?
One hypothesis is that in Finn's horizon of understanding–as
in many other authors–this dialogue is a priori impossible.
Finn's essays refute this hypothesis. Clearly, he is not making
that argument.
I
propose instead the hermeneutic hypothesis (1) that much of
the disagreement between the authors has to do with the use
of the word synthesis. In the introduction to his
first essay, Gronbacher uses the word synthesis (2)
to describe the relationship that he proposes between Christian
personalism and free-market thought, so I conjecture that
the title of Finn's response ("The Economic Personalism
of John Paul II: Neither Right Nor Left" (3)) must be
seen as a response to Gronbacher's proposed synthesis. Finn
argues not only that John Paul II is not as favorable to the
free market as Gronbacher implies, but that there is a complicated
relationship between free-market theories and Catholic social
thought. Finn raises a simple but important logical point.
We
can try to establish a dialogue between faith and reason,
and that is, in fact, the main task of Thomism.(4) When reason
and faith are mixed as if they are on the same footing, then
we encounter problems. However, I am not denying that a hermeneutic
circle exists between them; I am just saying that a dialogue
consists of at least two sides. The question-and-answer process
explained by Gadamer is in complete accordance with this point.
So
what? a reader could say. The point is that we all accept
that for philosophy and theology, but sometimes it is forgotten
in social science dialogues. In Catholic social thought this
has been and still is an important issue. When the popes "teach"
about political and economic issues, what are they talking
about? Are they teaching moral issues or technical points
in the social sciences?
The
answer seems to be that they teach moral issues but, in each
case, it is difficult to specify precisely. If a pope writes
about the just wage and adds that a free market is not enough
to achieve that moral ideal, what economic theory is he assuming?
Is that economic theory a universal moral principle of Catholic
social thought? Are economic theories and political theories
the same as the moral principles that belong to the first
and the second orders of the natural law?(5)
From
the reader's side: What is a person "waiting for"
when he or she reads a social encyclical–only moral
teachings or technical points in favor of his or her opinions?
I conjecture that the reader is waiting mainly for technical
issues. Please excuse me for not providing examples, but it
goes without saying that there are interpretations of papal
documents done in this way. If not, why did so many people
in the 1970s think that interventionist policies were the
Church's teaching? And why does it seem now that John Paul
II has "embraced" a free economy? What does the
word embrace mean in this context? Is the free market
a moral issue or a technical point? I will answer only what
is necessary to understand Finn's position.
If
we want to avoid those problems, we do not need an "exact
rule" but a main hermenutic point, which does not require
algorithmic exactness.(6) We have to distinguish between first
and second order moral laws and technical points not only
by their nature but also by their logical relations. There
are certain moral principles, especially those that belong
to the first and the second orders of the natural law that
are universal, and, therefore, should be logically included
in Catholic social thought. We can say that the universal
moral principles of Catholic social thought are deduced from
the moral principles of the Catholic faith. Therefore, we
have to proceed with caution, because those principles are
highly important and, at the same time, few and far between.
There
are other social issues that can be judged from a moral point
of view given the presence of free will. However, they are
not universal, because they require the "mediation"
of certain points that are, by definition, not part of the
Catholic faith: principles of social science, the interpretation
of history from the point of view of those principles, and
the application of those principles to a single historical
situation. To say that those points are "not part of
the Catholic faith" is not to say that they are in opposition
to Catholic social thought. The distinction I am drawing is
between those issues that are deduced from Catholic social
thought and those issues that merely do not contradict Catholic
teaching.
For
example, if I am a Keynesian economist, I will recommend deficit
spending for the unemployment problem. It would be my technical
opinion that deficit spending is not contradictory to Catholic
social thought, but I do not have any right to claim that
it is either "the" correct interpretation of Catholic
social thought or something "deduced from" Catholic
social thought. In the same way, if I am an Austrian economist
and I recommend free banking for the problem of inflation,
this position is neither contradictory to Catholic social
thought nor can it be considered "the" correct interpretation
of Catholic social thought. In neither case is it necessary
to have my theory or economic policy "blessed" by
the pope. Nevertheless, technical issues can be focused from
a moral point of view, as can free human action, but only
in a negative way.
Given
these principles, How do we interpret the paragraphs of John
Paul II and of any other pope that seem to be "in favor"
of free-market policies? If we read those paragraphs only
from an Austrian, Chicago, or Public Choice horizon of understanding,
we are going to be tempted to "mix" the moral point
with the technical point, so that we could succumb to a "clericalism
of the market" without realizing it. I conjecture that
this is Finn's main concern, which is the reason that he alludes
to many other issues where John Paul II and Catholic social
thought seem to be critical of the free market.
GRONBACHER'S
"CLARIFICATIONS": THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE
Now
we are able to understand the main point of Gronbacher's response:
"Neither I nor the work of the Center for Economic Personalism
advocate blind acceptance of free-market economics."(7)
The key word is blind; that is to say, a complete
mix of Catholic social thought and free-market theory without
proper distinctions. Gronbacher's central point is that the
philosophical and anthropological foundations of free-market
theories must be reformulated. This reformulation, this "new
foundation,"(8) may include phenomenology, neo-Thomism,
Karol Wojtyla's view of the acting person,(9) and other philosophical
viewpoints that are closer to a Catholic worldview and, therefore,
closer to the moral foundations of Catholic social thought.
Even in this case, we do not have to "mix," but,
given the proper distinctions, to work with Christian philosophy
in a Gilsonian way. It is important to affirm that economic
theory is not directly "deduced" from this
new foundation, but this foundation acts as a bridge for the
dialogue that Gronbacher proposes. Following our previous
distinction, those new foundations are able to rebuild certain
economic theories (Austrian economics, for example, with which
I am most familiar) so that their relation of "not being
contradictory" could be more clear. In this way, Gronbacher's
call for dialogue is the key to solving the tension between
Catholic social thought and the classical liberal tradition.
It is not a matter of mixing traditions or of advocating a
market clericalism, as I said before, but of developing a
conversation between both traditions. Gronbacher has realized
that this conversation would be impossible without first attempting
to reformulate the anthropological foundations of many of
the philosophical and epistemological issues that ground free-market
economics. But a new question arises: Can such a conversation
be carried out successfully?
NOT
SO FAST!
Now
we can understand Finn's latest response.(10) He has never
sought to end the conversation. All the problems he discusses
in his responses can be summed up in the expression: "Not
so fast!" What about the methodological foundations of
the three schools as stated by Gronbacher? Can we embrace
the methodological individualism of free-market economics?
Is the juridical framework that John Paul II discusses consonant
with the juridical assumptions of Mises and Hayek? What about
consumerism? Is it enough to say that consumerism is not a
systemic problem of free-market thought, but an anthropological
problem confronting all economic theories? One final question,
Will free-market economists be compelled to accept this new
foundation? If not, is that a problem? These questions should
not be seen as objections, they are simply important matters
to be discussed in their own right. This, at least, is my
intentio lectoris of Finn's responses. Can the problems
that Finn identifies be solved? Yes, I think so. Yet, as Finn's
essays communicate, there is a great deal of work to be done.
(1)
See H. G. Gadamer, Verdad y método (Barcelona: Guadalupe,
1991).
(2)
See Gregory M. A. Gronbacher, "The Need for Economic
Personalism," Journal of Markets and Morality 1, no.
1 (Spring 1998): 3.
(3)
Daniel Rush Finn, "The Economic Personalism of John Paul
II: Neither Right Nor Left," Journal of Markets and Morality
2, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 74—87.
(4)
See M. F. Sciacca, Historia de la filosofia (Barcelona: Luis
Miracle, 1954); E. Gilson, La filosofia en la Edad Media (Madrid:
Gredos, 1976); and Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), I, 1—9.
(5)
For more on the natural law, see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae
(Torino: Marietti, 1963), I—II, 90—96. On the
division between first and second order natural-law principles,
see ibid., I—II, 94, a, 5c, and J. Hoffner, Manual de
Doctrina social de la Iglesia (Madrid: Rialp, 1974), 3d part,
2, 4.
(6)
See Gadamer, Verdad y método, 385-86, and his lectures
published under the title of El problema de la conciencia
histórica (Madrid: Tecnos, 2000).
(7)
See Gregory M. A. Gronbacher, "The Humane Economy: Neither
Right Nor Left. A Response to Daniel Rush Finn," Journal
of Markets and Morality 2, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 254.
(8)
I am not using the word foundation in a Cartesian way, but
merely to clarify my use of the term so that it will not be
confused with pragmatism.
(9)
In this instance it is important to refer to Karol Wojtyla
and not to John Paul II.
(10)
See Daniel Rush Finn, "On the Choice of Method in Economics:
Options for Humanists. A Response to Gregory Gronbacher,"
Journal of Markets and Morality 3, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 224—37.
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